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I.   Introduction 
  An important goal of corporate governance reformers is to increase the 
representation of outside directors on corporate boards and committees. Because outside 
director are independent from management, they are believed to be willing to stand up to 
the CEO when necessary to protect shareholder interests. A new group of regulations, 
including the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) and rules promulgated by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission, New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and National 
Association of Securities Dealers, incorporate the idea that outside directors are important 
custodians of shareholder interests by requiring greater participation of outside directors 
on the board and key committees.  
  Yet the goal of increasing the number of outsiders is viewed with skepticism by 
some observers. Theoretically, it has long been recognized that the effectiveness of 
outside directors is limited by their inferior information compared to corporate insiders,  
and the notion that outsiders cannot effectively monitor and control agency problems has 
been a central premise of corporate finance research for decades (Berle and Means, 1932; 
Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1993).
1 Empirically, it is notoriously difficult to find 
reliable evidence that outside directors matter at all for performance, with most studies 
finding small, statistically insignificant correlations (Bhagat and Black, 2002; Hermalin 
and Weisbach, 2003; Field and Keys, 2003). Also, it seems possible that setting 
numerical targets for outside directors may be little more than window dressing because 
                                                 
1 For example, Jensen (1993, p. 864): “Serious information problems limit the effectiveness of board 
members in the typical large corporation. For example, the CEO almost always determines the agenda and 
the information given to the board. This limitation on information severely hinders the ability of even 
highly talented board members to contribute effectively to the monitoring and evaluation of the CEO and 
the company’s strategy.”   2
insiders can select directors that are independent according to regulatory definitions but 
are still unduly influenced by management. Increasing outsider representation on boards 
may simply be “quack corporate governance” (Romano, 2005).  
  The evidence that informs much of the skepticism, however, has its own 
limitations. Perhaps most important, board composition is endogenous. Although most 
studies fail to find a significant connection between board independence and firm 
performance, such a connection would be difficult to identify even if it existed if poor 
performance causes an increase in board independence, as in Hermalin and Weisbach 
(1998), or if changes in other factors cause comovements in board composition and firm 
performance, as in Harris and Raviv (forthcoming). In addition, it seems unlikely that an 
increase in outside directors would have a uniform impact across firms. Some firms may 
have constituted their boards to maximize value, in which case an increase in outside 
directors would be harmful, while in other firms managers may have constituted their 
boards with too few outsiders in order to minimize oversight, in which case an increase in 
outsiders would be helpful. Thus, we might not expect to see uniform performance 
effects associated with changes in board composition across all firms, but different 
effects among different subsamples of firms.  
  The purpose of this paper is to provide new empirical estimates of the 
effectiveness of outside directors that address both of these limitations of the previous 
literature, and sheds light on the conditions under which outside directors are effective. 
To address the problem of board endogeneity, we employ an identification strategy that 
takes advantage of exogenous increases in the number of outside directors due to recent 
regulatory changes. Specifically, we use the fact that some firms were forced to increase   3
the number of outsiders on their boards in response to several regulations adopted 
between 1999 and 2003. NYSE and Nasdaq regulations adopted in 1999 require audit 
committees to be comprised entirely of independent directors, a requirement that was 
extended and strengthened by SOX in 2002. In 2003, NYSE and NASD adopted 
additional rules that require boards to have a majority of independent directors.
2  
  With an identification strategy that controls for endogeneity, we are able to turn to 
the substantive question of when outside directors are likely to be effective. Our approach 
is motivated by recent theoretical research that suggests the effectiveness of outside 
directors depends on the information environment (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; 
Raheja, 2005; Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Harris and Raviv, forthcoming). It is a central 
premise of corporate finance research that insiders often have information that outsiders 
do not (e.g., Myers and Majluf (1984)). Theory suggests that when outside directors are 
able to acquire information at relatively low cost, they can be effective, but when 
information is very costly to acquire, they will be ineffective or possibly hurt 
performance.
3 Our basic approach is to identify firms where the cost of becoming 
informed is likely to be high and compare them to firms where the cost of information is 
likely to be low. For each group of firms, we estimate the relation between performance 
and the percentage of outsiders on the board, using exogenous changes due to the new 
regulations to identify the effects.  
                                                 
2 The idea of using regulatory changes to identify exogenous changes in board structure also motivates 
Dahya and McConnell (2007) that links changes in performance among U.K. firms to changes in board 
independence recommended by the Cadbury Report of 1992. They find large positive improvements in 
ROA and stock returns associated with increases in outsiders.  
3 Long-run trends are broadly consistent with this view.  Legal scholars such as Gordon (2007) have 
observed that the secular increase in the informativeness of stock prices and analyst coverage over the 
period 1950-2005 coincide with a greater representation of independent directors.   4
  Our main finding is that adding outside directors to the board does not help or 
hurt performance on average, consistent with the previous literature (even after 
controlling for endogeneity), but that outsiders significantly improve performance when 
their information cost is low, and hurt performance when their information cost is high. 
These findings are quite robust. We show that they appear whether performance is 
measured by earnings, Tobin’s Q, or stock return, and for several different information 
cost measures. The estimated magnitudes are nontrivial: a 10 percent increase in the 
percentage of outside directors on the board is associated with 1.3 percent higher ROA in 
firms with an information cost in the lowest quartile compared to 1.7 percent lower ROA 
in firms with an information cost in the highest quartile, controlling for other 
determinants of performance. Similarly, a 10 percent increase in board independence is 
associated with 8.1 percent higher Q in low information cost firms compared to 15.8 
percent lower Q in high information cost firms. 
  Our central findings suggest that outsider effectiveness depends on the cost of 
acquiring information about the firm. The main information cost proxies we employ are 
based on analyst forecasts (errors, variance, number). We also explore several alternative 
information cost variables in order to understand the nature of the information problem 
that seems to influence outsider effectiveness. To distinguish information costs that face 
outsiders but not insiders (asymmetric information) from fundamental uncertainty, we 
allow outside director effectiveness to depend on stock return volatility, which is 
sometimes used to measure fundamental uncertainty in the empirical literature on 
corporate boards. We find that stock return volatility adds little explanatory power, 
suggesting that asymmetric information is the central driver, consistent with the emphasis   5
of recent theory. We also include the market-to-book ratio to capture information costs 
associated with growth opportunities, and a measure of intangible assets to capture 
information costs associated with intangibility. Our estimates suggest that outside 
director effectiveness depends on the market-to-book ratio as well as analyst forecast 
errors and variance, but does not depend on intangibility of assets.  
  We explore several possible sources of spurious correlation. All our regressions 
include industry controls so the information cost variables are not simply industry 
proxies. To investigate the possibility that our outside director effects are actually 
capturing changes in director expertise, we introduce direct measures of financial, 
corporate, and academic expertise. To consider the possibility that the performance 
differences we detect are due to unmeasured SOX effects that impact low information 
cost firms more than high information cost firms, we allow performance changes to 
depend directly on information costs. The central finding that outsider effectiveness 
depends on information cost survives these attempts to make the result disappear. 
  Finally, we explore a related implication of the view that the effectiveness of 
outside directors depends on the cost of information. If our evidence that outsider 
effectiveness depends on information costs is not spurious, we would expect firms to take 
information cost into account when constituting their boards. To test this implication, we 
estimate the relation between board composition and our measure of information cost. 
We find that firms do take information conditions into account: firms with a higher cost 
of acquiring information have fewer outsiders on their boards than firms with a lower 
cost of acquiring information.   6
  The evidence we report suggests that outside directors can improve governance, 
and that the insider-outsider ratio may be more than window dressing. It seems that in 
firms where outsiders were able to acquire information at low cost, boards have been 
constituted with too many insiders, and the mandated increase in outsider representation 
was a boon for shareholders. In contrast, in firms where outsiders suffer from severe 
information disadvantages, the mandates appear to have harmed shareholder interests. 
Our evidence thus provides some support for regulations that require increased 
representation of outsiders on corporate boards and committees, but they include an 
important caveat by documenting situations in which increases in outside directors can be 
counterproductive. Consistent with recent theory, it may be optimal for some boards to be 
controlled by insiders, and forcing outsider control can reduce firm value. Our findings 
also suggest that the literature’s failure to find a robust connection between board 
composition and firm performance may have been because the effects cancel out on 
average (when not conditioned on information). In terms of theory, our evidence suggests 
that to some degree boards are constituted to maximize value and information cost 
considerations appear to be an important factor in those decisions, which supports the 
message of Raheja (2005), Adams and Ferreira (2007), and Harris and Raviv 
(forthcoming). However, our finding that externally driven changes in the number of 
outsiders can increase performance suggests that boards are not constituted entirely with 
an eye toward value maximization. 
  The paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses recent regulatory changes, 
highlights new rules that have altered the composition of corporate boards and 
committees, and presents testable predictions from four competing views of boards.   7
Section III provides a simple theoretical framework that helps interpret the empirical 
evidence. Section IV discusses the data, and goes into some detail about how the cost of 
acquiring information is measured. Section V reports evidence on the connection between 
outside directors and firm performance. Section VI explores the nature of the information 
costs that influence director effectiveness. Section VII reports several exercises that 
investigate possible sources of spurious correlation. Section VIII reports evidence that 
board composition is related to information costs. Section IX discusses implications. 
 
II.   New Regulations and Testable Predictions 
SOX and the exchange rules that it engendered represent perhaps the most 
significant overhaul of public company regulations in the United States since the Great 
Depression. At their core, the new regulations are intended to improve the auditing of 
U.S. public companies, and cover a variety of subjects, including auditor oversight, 
disclosure rules, auditor-client relationship, and criminal penalties (Coates, 2007). Of 
particular interest for our purposes are new requirements concerning independent 
directors. Table 1 summarizes the key provisions. Although SOX is the central piece of 
legislation, the reform movement began a few years earlier (1999) when the NYSE and 
Nasdaq required corporate audit committees to consist entirely of independent directors, a 
requirement written into law by SOX. Independence is defined as a person who does not 
“accept any consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee from the issuer” and is not 
“an affiliated person of the issuer or any subsidiary thereof,” other than in his or her   8
capacity as a director (Section 301).
4 NYSE and Nasdaq regulations approved by the SEC 
in 2003 go beyond SOX and require a majority of directors on the board to be 
independent. They also set minimal participation levels for independent directors on the 
compensation and nominating committees, and expand the definition of independence to 
be a director who “has no material relationship with the listed company (either directly or 
as a partner, shareholder or officer of an organization that has a relationship with the 
company).” A director is not considered independent if, among other things, he or she or 
an immediate family member was an employee in the previous three years (other than as 
a director), he or she or an immediate family member is connected to the firm’s auditor, 
or he or she works for a company that does business with the firm. 
  Firms responded to the phasing in of the new regulations by significantly 
increasing the representation of independent directors on their boards and committees 
over time. Figure 1 shows the change in the composition of corporate boards and 
committees from 1996 to 2005, based on data from the Investor Responsibility Research 
Center (IRRC). In these data, a director is “independent” if he or she is not an employee 
of the company and is not “linked”  to the firm (that is, is not a former employee, 
employee of an organization that receives charitable gifts from the company, employee of 
a customer or supplier to the company, relative of an executive director, and so on). 
Figure 1 shows that from 1996 to 2000, the number of firms with a majority of 
independent directors on their boards (“firms with independent boards”) was fairly stable 
                                                 
4 The main SOX requirements on audit committee independence were part of the recommendations issued 
by the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees in February 
1999. The SEC approved new exchange listing standards in December 1999 requiring firms to have fully 
independent audit committees. The rules at the time grandfathered then-serving audit committee members 
until their re-election or replacement.   9
in the 72-74 percent range. In 2000, roughly 76 percent of firms had a board with a 
majority of independent directors. By 2005, the most recent year for which data are 
available, 94 percent of boards had a majority of independent directors. A similar pattern 
appears for the mean percentage of independent directors across all firms: it was stable in 
the 59 to 61 percent range from 1996 to 2000, and rose to 71 percent in 2005. 
Committees also became more independent. Over the period 1998-2005, representation 
of independent directors rose from 81 to 95 percent on audit committees, from 85 to 94 
percent on compensation committees, and from 72 to 92 percent on nominating 
committees.  
Our identification strategy is based on the observation that some firms, but not all, 
were forced to change the composition of their boards by the new regulations. Firms can 
be classified into treatment and control groups depending on whether they were in 
compliance or not with the new regulations when they were introduced. This idea 
motivates an instrumental variables approach where firm (non)compliance with the new 
regulations is used to identify an exogenous shift in the percentage of outside directors. 
The resulting variation in board composition allows us to generate estimates of the effect 
of outside directors on firm performance that are largely free from the standard 
endogeneity concerns. 
Our main analysis uses noncompliance with the requirement of a fully 
independent audit committee to identify exogenous increases in the representation of 
outside directors on the corporation’s board.
5 However, it is possible that noncompliant 
                                                 
5 We also estimated the empirical models using noncompliance with other exchange regulations, and the 
results were similar. In contrast to the audit committee requirement, these other regulations do not apply   10
firms could create a fully independent audit committee by assigning existing independent 
board members to the audit committee. To get a sense of how firms actually brought their 
audit committees into compliance, we compared the composition of boards in 2000 and 
2005. Board independence increased by about 16 percent at noncompliant firms (from 52 
percent to 68 percent) during the period. In contrast, board independence increased by 
only 4 percent at compliant firms (from 70 percent to 74 percent) during the same period. 
It appears that firms responded to the new rules by adding independent directors to the 
board, and not just by assigning existing independent directors to the audit committee. 
We also note that the average size of corporate boards was approximately constant for 
both compliant and noncompliant firms from 2000 to 2005, implying that the change in 
board composition was brought about by replacing nonindependent directors with 
independent directors.  
Our analysis seeks to shed light on four competing views about how boards work. 
According to the window-dressing view, held by skeptics of recent reforms and 
expressed by Romano (2005), setting numerical targets for independent directors through 
regulation will not improve corporate governance because managers can select directors 
that are independent according to regulatory definitions but are still unduly influenced by 
management. For example, a director who is a personal friend of the CEO could be 
independent in the eyes of the law, but not inclined to challenge the CEO. From this 
perspective, the 16 percent average increase in board independence from 2000 to 2005 at 
noncompliant firms represents a shell game in which managers are able to put their allies 
on the board as independent directors, much like the often-cited example of Disney 
                                                                                                                                                 
uniformly to all issuers (domestic versus foreign, large versus small firms, controlled versus uncontrolled), 
making them noisier instruments.   11
appointing to its board the principal of a school attended by CEO Michael Eisner’s 
children (Byrne et al., 1997). The window-dressing view predicts that an increase in 
measured board independence has no effect on performance. 
The entrenchment view, held by some legislators who voted for SOX and 
regulators who provided expert advice, predicts that an increase in board independence 
has a positive effect on performance. Outside directors are expected to be reliable 
monitors of management, act independently and look after shareholder interests, so 
increasing their representation on boards should improve corporate governance, reduce 
agency problems, and improve firm performance. In addition, outside directors may 
improve performance by bringing with them skills that complement those of 
management. We call this the entrenchment view because it is based on the assumption 
that market forces alone are unable to bring about a value-maximizing level of 
management oversight. Given that the amount of talent and capital that can target agency-
plagued firms in the market for corporate control is limited, setting numerical targets for 
outside directors through regulation can be an effective way of bringing about wholesale 
value-enhancing change. 
We call the opposite view, that boards are constituted to maximize value, the 
optimization view. According to this view, managers trade off the strengths and 
weaknesses of inside and outside directors in order to maximize shareholder value, and 
forcing firms to increase the number of outside directors would destroy value. So, a 
mandated increase in board independence is predicted to hurt performance. 
Last but not least is the tradeoff view, which combines the lessons of recent 
information-based theories (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Raheja, 2005; Adams and   12
Ferreira, 2007; Harris and Raviv, forthcoming) with the possibility that managers distort 
board composition to reduce oversight. The tradeoff view predicts that the effect of an 
increase in board independence will depend on information conditions. When the 
information environment allows outsiders to become informed at a reasonable cost, they 
can serve as effective monitors and advisors. Greater board independence beyond the 
level preferred by oversight-averse managers then results in improved performance. In 
contrast, when the information environment makes it difficult for outsiders to serve 
effectively, the tradeoff view predicts that greater board independence will hurt 
performance.  
The tradeoff view is an extension of recent models, but its predictions are not 
entirely obvious. Because the tradeoff model turns out to provide the best explanation for 
the empirical patterns we find, the next section provides a simple version of the theory 
that helps frame the empirical analysis. 
 
III.  Reduced-Form Model of the Tradeoff View 
Most empirical research on boards has been guided by intuitions rather than 
explicit models, in part because theoretical work on board composition is limited. 
Recently, several papers have appeared that attempt to model the functions and 
composition of boards. In Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), the function of boards is to 
evaluate the quality of the CEO and determine whether to retain or replace the CEO. In 
Raheja (2005), the function of boards is to evaluate and approve projects proposed by 
management, and choose the CEO’s successor. In Harris and Raviv (forthcoming), the 
function of boards is to evaluate projects proposed by management, and decide whether   13
to approve the projects. In Adams and Ferreira (2007), boards advise and monitor the 
CEO, who values advising but dislikes monitoring. These papers assume that outsiders 
have interests more closely aligned with those of shareholders, but outsiders have access 
to less information or have a higher cost of acquiring information than insiders. Insiders 
receive private benefits from actions that can compromise firm value. The optimal mix of 
insiders and outsiders trades off the inferior information of outsiders with their lower 
susceptibility to agency problems. The models imply that it is optimal to increase the 
number of outsiders when outsiders become more informed or their cost of acquiring 
information declines. 
One limitation of these papers as a foundation for empirical work is that they 
study optimal board composition. In such a framework, exogenously imposed changes in 
board composition like SOX can only reduce value. The models rule out (by assumption) 
the premise of recent regulatory changes that boards are not composed optimally. Recent 
regulations appear to be motivated by the Berle-Means notion that boards are the 
creatures of incumbent management. Since one question of interest is whether boards are 
in fact optimally composed or can be improved by outside regulations, we need a 
framework that encompasses both possibilities. The model that follows incorporates the 
lessons about from recent theory about information costs with the insight from agency 
theory that the CEO may be overly hesitant to appoint outsiders to the board. 
The optimal board composition literature suggests that firm value depends on the 
cost outsiders must pay to become informed, C, and on whether the board is controlled by   14
insiders or outsiders,  } , { OUT IN B∈ .
6 To incorporate this insight, we represent firm 
value as  ) (C VB . Define  ) ( ) ( ) ( C V C V C IN OUT − = Δ  to be the value of an outsider-
controlled firm relative to the value of an insider-controlled firm. Following the literature, 
0 / < ∂ ∂ C VB  (firm value is lower when the cost of acquiring information is high) and 
0 / < ∂ Δ ∂ ≡ Δ C C  (a high information cost hurts outsider-controlled firms more than 
insider-controlled firms). We also assume that Δ can be positive for some values of C 
and negative for other values, so that both insider and outsider control can both be 
optimal. Figure 2 depicts the value of the firm conditional on information costs and board 
control. 
This setup implies there is a critical information cost 
* C  such that for 
* C C < , 
outsider control is optimal and for 
* C C >  insider control is optimal. If boards are 
constituted to maximize value, an exogenous change from insider to outsider control – 
the policy experiment associated with the new regulations – reduces firm value. 
To incorporate the possibility that boards are not constituted optimally, but also 
partly reflect the desire of the incumbent CEO to stifle dissent, we suppose that the CEO 
chooses the percentage of outsiders to maximize his or her own utility. The CEO’s utility 
function is 
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6 We follow Harris and Raviv (forthcoming) here by focusing on who controls the board rather than the 
precise ratio of insiders to outsiders, our main empirical measure. Focusing on the precise ratio of insiders 
to outsiders yields a richer set of predictions, but the wealth consequences always remain monotonically 
related to information costs.   15
 
The CEO cares about firm value (because the CEO is also a shareholder, cares 
about his or her reputation, etc.) but also receives a private benefit from insider control 
given by α , which we treat as a random variable with a differentiable distribution F. 
When  0 = α , the CEO chooses the board to maximize value. 
The CEO creates an outsider controlled board if  ) ( ) ( C U C U IN OUT > . For  0 > α , 
this changes the critical information cost value to  α C , as shown in Figure 2, making 
insider control more likely for any given C. The probability of an outsider controlled 
board is then  ) ( ) Pr( )) ( ) ( Pr( Δ = > Δ = > = F C U C U p IN OUT α . It is straightforward to 
show that  0 / < Δ ′ = ∂ ∂ C F C p . The probability of outsider control responds to the cost of 
information in the optimal direction: as it becomes more costly for outsiders to become 
informed, outsider control becomes less likely. This observation implies that we cannot 
distinguish value-maximizing from suboptimal board composition based on the relation 
between board composition and information costs in the cross-section or across time. 
Even boards that are not constituted optimally respond to information costs in the same 
qualitative way as value maximizing boards. 
Our empirical question is how an exogenous change in board composition affects 
value at different firms depending on their information environments. To study this 
theoretically, consider an exogenous change from insider to outsider control. As Figure 2 
shows, when 
* C C < ,  IN OUT V V >  so the change in control increases the firm’s value. In 
this region, insider control is not optimal, and the regulation counteracts the CEO’s 
agency problem and helps shareholders. When 
* C C > ,  IN OUT V V <  so the change in   16
control reduces the firm’s value. In this region, insider control is optimal. By forcing the 
firm to an inefficient governance arrangement, the regulation reduces the firm’s value. 
The empirical prediction is that (a) for firms with low information costs, an exogenous 
increase in board independence should be associated with higher value and improved 
performance – the policy exercise forces firms with suboptimal insider control to have 
optimal outsider control, and (b) for firms with high information costs, the change should 
reduce value and hurt performance – the policy exercise forces these firms with optimal 
insider control to have suboptimal outsider control. 
 
IV.   Data 
  Our analysis uses three primary data sources. Information on directors and boards 
comes from the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), information to 
construct information cost variables is taken from I/B/E/S, and data on firm performance 
is taken from Compustat and CRSP. Our main analysis examines performance changes 
over the period 2000-2005. We use 2000 as the benchmark year because the regulatory 
innovations began in December 1999 when the exchanges adopted the recommendations 
of the Blue Ribbon Committee. We then study performance out to 2005 to allow time for 
the additional regulations to be adopted and phased in. We investigate three different 
measures of performance: return on assets (ROA), Tobin’s Q, and stock returns. For 
Tobin’s Q, we compute log changes so that the estimated regression coefficients have a 
percentage interpretation. For stock returns, we compute average monthly returns from 
the end of fiscal year 2000 to the end of fiscal year 2005. All three measures are reported 
as percentages throughout the paper. Control variables include board size, firm age   17
(number of years since the firm’s first appearance on Compustat with valid asset data), 
leverage ratio (debt divided by book assets), and the log of firm size (measured by the 
market value of equity).
7 We winsorize all variables at the 1
st and 99
th percentiles (the 
results are similar if we do not winsorize the variables). Our sample covers the period 
from 1996 to 2005, and contains 15,820 firm-year-observations for 2,897 firms. The 
sample period is primarily determined by the IRRC data, which run from 1996 to 2005.
8 
Panel A of Table 2 reports summary statistics for the whole sample. 
Our main analysis focuses on three variables that are intended to measure an 
outsider’s cost of becoming informed. The variables follow Krishnaswami and 
Subramanian (1999) and are based on the availability, homogeneity, and accuracy of 
analysts’ quarterly earnings forecasts. The first measure is the number of analysts who 
posted forecasts about the firm in a given year.
9 We postulate that more information is 
available to outsiders about the firm when it is followed by more analysts. The second 
measure is the dispersion of analyst forecasts, measured as the standard deviation of 
earnings forecasts across analysts prior to a quarterly earnings announcement, normalized 
                                                 
7 Specifically, ROA = Data Item 13 / Data Item 6, Tobin’s Q = (Data Item 6 + Data Item 25 * Data Item 
199 – Data Item 60 – Data Item 74) / Data Item 6, book leverage ratio = (Data Item 9 + Data Item 34) / 
(Item 9 + Data Item 34 + Data Item 60 + Data Item 130), and firm size = Data Item 25 * Data Item 199.  
8 The IRRC database provides annual data for the years 1996-2005 on directors in 3,037 firms (152,718 
director-year observations), derived from corporate bylaws and charters, proxy statements, annual reports, 
and SEC filings such as 10-Ks and 10-Qs. For details, see Gompers et al. (2003). We drop director-year 
observations with missing director identifier or director type (Employee, Linked or Affiliated, 
Independent). 
9 We count forecasts from the same I/B/E/S analyst identifier and the same brokerage house as a single 
analyst. Because the number of analysts is strongly correlated with firm size, and firm size is correlated 
with performance, we use a size-adjusted number of analysts in Section IV when constructing the 
information index and when studying performance. Specifically, we regress the number of analysts on firm 
size and use the residuals from that regression as the number of analysts.   18
by the firm’s total book assets and averaged across four quarters in a given year. A lack 
of consensus among analysts (high standard deviation) suggests it is difficult for outsiders 
to become informed about the firm. The third measure is the analyst forecast error, 
measured as the absolute difference between the mean analyst earnings forecast prior to a 
quarterly earnings announcement and the actual earnings, normalized by the firm’s total 
book assets and averaged across four quarters in a given year. Large forecast errors 
indicate a greater difficulty of becoming informed. We also construct an information cost 
index that combines the three separate measures by averaging a firm’s percentile ranking 
in the sample according to each measure (for the number of analysts, the reverse ranking 
is used). We then scale the index to range from zero (low) to one (high). We consider 
several other information cost measures in the robustness section of the paper. 
  An important issue in an experiment like ours is whether treatment and control 
firms are somehow different in a systematic way. To get a sense of observable 
differences, Panel B of Table 2 compares firms that were and were not in compliance 
with SOX in 2000. Thirty-six percent of sample firms were not in compliance with SOX 
in 2000. Because compliance status depends on the number of independent directors, the 
fact that noncompliant firms had 17 percent fewer independent directors than compliant 
firms is expected. Only a few other differences emerge. The average board contained 
about 10 members in both compliant and noncompliant firms. Return on assets was 
lower, Q was lower, and stock return was higher in compliant than noncompliant firms, 
but these differences fall short of conventional levels of statistical significance. All three 
information cost variables suggest that information was more costly to acquire for 
compliant than noncompliant firms, but only one difference (analyst forecast dispersion)   19
can be statistically distinguished from zero. Compliant firms were smaller than 
noncompliant firms on average, with a significant difference when size is measured by 
market capitalization but not when measured by assets. Book leverage ratio and firm age 
were not significantly different in compliant and noncompliant firms. Compliant and 
noncompliant firms appear to be fairly similar. Our regressions attempt to control for 
observable differences that appear in Table 2. To control for the possibility of 
unobservable time invariant determinants of performance, we study changes in return on 
assets, Q, and stock return from 2000 to 2005, essentially differencing out time invariant 
factors. The robustness section of the paper explores the possibility of time-varying 
factors. 
  Since we are going to be comparing changes in performance during 2000-2005 
with changes in board composition, essentially a difference-in-difference approach, it is 
also important consider whether the performance of noncompliant (treatment) and 
compliant (control) firms were following similar trends before treatment, that is, whether 
the parallel trends assumption holds. Figure 3 shows the trends visually, plotting the 
industry-adjusted ROA of noncompliant and compliant firms relative to 1996. As can be 
seen, the compliant and noncompliant firms were on similar trajectories until about 2000, 
when a sharp break appears. This suggests that the parallel trends assumption is valid, 
and more formal comparisons (not reported) generally point toward the same conclusion. 
The divergence between low and high information cost firms shows that our main results 
controlling for a number of factors are already in the data nonparametrically. It is also 
worth noting that the divergence is fairly consistent during 2000-2005, indicating that the 
results are not driven by events in any one particular year.   20
V.  Evidence on Outside Directors and Firm Performance 
A.   Main Results 
Having described the new regulations affecting boards and our data sources, we 
now turn to estimating the effect of greater board representation of outside directors on 
firm performance. Recall that the window-dressing view predicts no effect, the 
entrenchment view predicts a uniformly positive effect, the optimization view predicts a 
uniformly negative effect, and the tradeoff view predicts different effects conditional on 
information costs. 
  Our baseline empirical model assumes that performance is determined according 
to: 
 
(1)  jt jt j jt j jt e I C I C V + + + + = ... γ β α , 
 
where j indexes a firm, t indexes a year, V is a measure of performance, I is a variable 
indicating board independence, and C represents the cost of information. Equation (1) 
assumes that performance and independence vary over time, but information cost does 
not.
10 The marginal effect of outside directors on performance is  C dI dV γ β + = /.  W e  
are interested in two questions. The first is whether outside directors influence 
performance, that is, if  0 / = dI dV . Since the effect of outside directors depends on C, we 
need to estimate effects for different levels of information cost. The second question is 
                                                 
10 Less than two percent of the firms in our sample went from being classified as low (high) information 
cost firms in 2000 to being classified as high (low) information cost firms in 2005.   21
whether the marginal effect depends on information cost. This is tested by investigating 
whether  C I V ∂ ∂ ∂ /
2 , which boils down to whether  0 = γ .  
  Instead of estimating (1), we estimate first differences:  
 
(2)  j j j j e I C I V Δ + + Δ + Δ = Δ ... γ β , 
 
where  2000 2005 X X X − ≡ Δ . Equation (2) removes firm-specific fixed effects, and the 
information cost variable remains only in the interaction term. We also include industry 
fixed effects for the 48 Fama-French (1997) industries to control for the possibility that 
the information cost index, instead of capturing firm-level informational cost, proxies for 
industries that performed badly over the sample period for other reasons. The results turn 
out to be essentially the same with or without industry dummies. The regressions also 
control for various factors previously found to be correlated with performance, including 
board size, leverage ratio, firm age, and firm size in 2000. Standard errors are corrected 
to allow for clustering of the error terms at the industry level. 
  To address the endogeneity problem associated with board composition, we 
estimate a first-stage regression that identifies exogenous changes in board composition 
from 2000 to 2005 based on compliance with SOX in 2000, and then use fitted changes 
in board composition from the first-stage regression to explain changes in firm 
performance from 2000 to 2005 in the second-stage regressions. Using compliance with 
SOX in 2000 allows us capture the full impact of the new regulations on board 
composition starting with the rules approved by the SEC in December 1999 (the rules 
grandfathered then-serving board members until their re-election or replacement and   22
Figure 1 shows that the immediate response in 2000 was not significant). Our approach 
does not capture changes in board composition in SOX-compliant firms that may have 
been driven by pressure from activist investors and others. This omission makes it harder 
to detect effects, and can be seen as biasing our results toward zero. 
  Before reporting our results, we note that an alternative estimation approach 
would be to estimate a panel regression over the entire 1996-2005 period with firm fixed 
effects to identify the effect of exogenous changes in board composition caused by the 
new regulations. We find that such panel regressions yield quantitatively similar results. 
This is not entirely surprising because the sharp break between the performance of 
noncompliant and compliant firms does not take place before 2000 (Figure 3). The 
benefit of our approach, namely of reducing the sample to just one before-versus-after 
observation per firm, is that we avoid a possibly severe serial correlation problem that 
arises when using long time series in differences-in-differences estimation (Bertrand, 
Duflo and Mullainathan, 2004). 
Table 3 reports our estimates. Column (1) reports the first-stage regression that 
predicts the change in percentage of outsiders on the board. Noncompliance with SOX is 
a strong predictor: firms that did not comply with SOX in 2000 increased outside 
directors by 11.4 percent during the sample period, an effect that is different from zero at 
better than the 1 percent level of statistical significance. The remaining columns regress 
changes in firm performance on fitted changes in board composition. The performance 
variable is indicated at the top of each column. Regressions (2)-(4) do not include 
information cost variables. These regressions are similar to those in the existing literature 
– the only difference is that the first-stage regression provides changes in board   23
composition that are exogenous with respect to changes in firm performance. Consistent 
with the prior literature, we do not find a strong relation between performance and board 
composition. An increase in the percentage of independent directors seems to have a tiny 
positive effect on return on assets, a negative effect on Tobin’s Q, and a positive effect on 
stock returns although none of the effects can be distinguished from zero at conventional 
levels of statistical significance. 
Columns (5)-(7) contain our central results. In these regressions, we allow the 
effect of outside directors to depend on the cost of acquiring information by introducing a 
term that interacts the changes in percentage of outsiders with the information cost index. 
Recall that the information cost index is based on the three measures of information cost 
and takes on values from zero to one, with high values indicating a high information cost. 
Two important findings emerge from these estimates. First, the coefficient on the 
interaction term is negative and different from zero at high levels of statistical 
significance. As predicted by the tradeoff view, the marginal effect of outside directors 
depends on how costly it is for outsiders to acquire information about the firm.  
Second, the estimates reveal that changes in board composition have a material 
impact on firm performance. The coefficients imply a nontrivial effect of outside 
directors on performance. For firms in the lowest information cost quartile (with a mean 
information cost index of 0.23), a 10 percent increase in the percentage of outside 
directors (roughly comparable to the impact of the new regulations on noncompliant 
firms) is associated with 1.3 percent higher ROA, 8.1 percent higher Q, and 3.8 percent 
higher annual stock returns over the sample period. All of these effects are different from 
zero at the 5 percent level or better. One interpretation of this evidence is that before the   24
new regulations took effect corporate insiders were restricting the representation of 
outsiders on their boards in order to reduce oversight, and this restriction resulted in 
decisions that reduced firm performance. For firms in the highest information cost 
quartile (with a mean information cost index of 0.74), a 10 percent increase in the 
percentage of outside directors is associated with 1.7 percent lower ROA, 15.8 percent 
lower Q, and 2.4 percent lower annual stock returns over the sample period. All three 
values are different from zero at the 5 percent level or better. This evidence is consistent 
with the view that before the new regulations took effect high information cost firms 
were optimally filling their boards with insiders, and the new regulations forced them to 
shift to an inefficient board structure. The marginal effect for the median information cost 
firm is small in magnitude and statistically distinguishable from zero only for Q. 
  Table 3’s evidence of a large, statistically significant connection between board 
independence and performance stands in contrast to much of the previous literature. One 
reason for the difference appears to be the dependence of outsider effectiveness on 
information cost. Outsiders appear to help performance when the cost of information is 
low, and hurt performance when the cost of information is high, but the positive and 
negative effects cancel out on average. Previous studies have not conditioned on 
information, and as a result, were only able to detect the unconditional effect of outsiders, 
which appears to be close to zero. Another possible reason we detect significant outsider 
effects may be due to our identification strategy that uses (non)compliance to identify 
exogenous changes in board composition. Without an instrument to identify exogenous   25
changes in board composition, previous studies may have suffered from attenuating 
biases due to the endogeneity of board composition and firm performance.
11  
To shed some light on why our results differ from previous research, we re-
estimated the main regressions in Table 3 without using the first-stage regression to 
identify exogenous changes in board composition. The results are in Table 4. The 
unconditional relation between performance and board composition in columns (2)-(4) of 
Table 4 is small and not statistically significant. When conditioned on information 
(columns (5)-(7)), the coefficients on board independence take the same signs as in Table 
3, but are three to ten times smaller in magnitude. In column (5) of Table 4, for instance, 
a 10 percent increase in the percentage of independent directors is associated with a 0.4 
percent increase in return on assets for low information cost firms, compared to a 1.3 
percent increase in column (5) of Table 3, which uses the instrument. A negative impact 
of information cost on outsider effectiveness appears in Table 4 even without an 
instrument, but only the interaction coefficient in column (6) is significantly different 
from zero. A comparison of Tables 3 and 4 suggests that endogeneity of board 
composition may be a significant problem, but the dependence of board effectiveness on 
information cost is equally important. Detecting the effect of board composition on 
                                                 
11 It is perhaps worth restating that our ability to estimate the effectiveness of independent directors relies 
on the absence of systematic pre-treatment differences between noncompliant and compliant firms that may 
account for differences in post-treatment performance. As mentioned above, the fact that we do not observe 
a divergence between the performance of noncompliant and compliant firms before 2000 provides some 
support for our approach. Further support comes from our finding of significant results associated with 
post-treatment stock returns. In an efficient market, pre-treatment differences that are unobservable to us as 
econometricians but observable to market participants are incorporated into prices before treatment and 
hence cannot account for post-treatment return differences.   26
performance appears to require both a method to address the endogeneity problem and 
conditioning on information cost. 
  
B.   Robustness 
The two central findings of Table 3 – outside directors matter for performance 
and the effect depends on the information environment – turn out to be robust to a variety 
of changes in specification. We next report, in Table 5, the results of several robustness 
exercises. Each column of each panel reports the coefficients from a single regression in 
which the dependent variable is change in performance during 2000-2005, as before. The 
control variables are the same as in Table 3, but to conserve space, we only report the 
coefficients on board independence and independence interacted with information cost.  
The regressions in panels A, B, and C use the individual measures of information 
cost instead of the index that aggregates the three measures. To maintain comparability 
with the index-based results, we rank firms according to each measure and rescale the 
percentile rankings to fall between zero (low) and one (high). As can be seen, the 
interaction term is negative for all three information cost measures and all three 
performance measures, and different from zero at the 1 percent level of significance in all 
nine cases. Thus, the basic patterns are not dependent on precisely which of our 
information cost measures we use. 
A second issue has to do with our definition of compliance. Our main regressions 
identify exogenous changes in board independence by whether a firm complied with the 
requirement of a fully independent audit committee. In panel D, we consider instead 
compliance with exchange regulations approved in 2003 that required a majority of   27
outside directors on the board. Approximately 17 percent of firms were noncompliant 
according to both definitions, but 10 percent of firms were compliant with the audit 
committee requirement but not compliant with the board majority requirement, and 19 
percent were compliant with the board majority requirement but not compliant with the 
audit committee requirement. This new definition of compliance changes the 
instrumental variable in the first-stage regression (now it is a dummy equal to one if the 
firm did not have a majority of independent directors in 2000) but the empirical approach 
is otherwise the same. The estimated effects of independent directors that appear in panel 
D are qualitatively similar to those in Table 3. Independent directors are associated with 
improved performance when the information cost is low and worse performance when 
the information cost is high. The coefficients are smaller in magnitude with the board 
majority definition of compliance from 2003 than the audit committee definition from 
1999, suggesting that the earlier requirements may have had more impact in practice. 
A third issue concerns whether the numbers of independent directors has to reach 
a critical level for performance to change. Our analysis to this point focuses on the 
percentage of independent directors on the board, implicitly assuming that the effect of 
independent directors on performance is linear. However, the new exchange regulations 
and voting theory suggest that what might be critical is whether or not outsiders comprise 
a majority of the board (that is, a change in outsiders from 45 percent to 55 percent might 
matter more than a change from 85 percent to 95 percent). The regressions in panel E 
explore this possibility by using changes in board control as an explanatory variable in 
second-stage regressions instead of changes in the percentage of outsiders. We define a 
change in board control as +100 if the board changes from a majority of insiders to a   28
majority of outsiders, 0 if the identity of the majority does not change, and -100 if it 
changes from a majority of outsiders to a majority of insiders. As before, we identify 
exogenous changes in board control based on compliance with the requirement of a fully 
independent audit committee in a first-stage regression and then use fitted changes in 
board control to explain changes in firm performance. We do not report the first-stage 
regression, but the estimates indicate that a switch in board control was 23.4 percent more 
likely at a noncompliant firm than a compliant firm, distinguishable from zero at better 
than the 1 percent level. 
  The estimates in Panel E show that for all three measures of performance, the 
effect of a change in control varies with the information environment: the interaction 
coefficients are negative in all three columns and different from zero at 1 percent level in 
each case. The regressions also indicate that outsider control improves performance when 
the information cost is low and hurts performance when the information cost is high, and 
the magnitudes of the effects are large: for firms in the lowest information cost quartile, a 
change from insider to outsider control (which happens with a roughly 23.4 percent 
probability at noncompliant firms) is associated with a 1.0 percent increase in return on 
assets, a 6.7 percent increase in Q, and a 3.9 percent increase in annual stock return. All 
of these effects are different from zero at the 10 percent level or better. For firms in the 
highest information cost quartile, a shift from insider to outsider control is associated 
with a 1.3 percent decline in return on assets, a 15.4 percent fall in Q, and 2.4 percent 
lower annual stock returns. These values are also different from zero at the 10 percent   29
level or better. These findings are consistent with our previous evidence, and suggest that 
changes in board control and board composition are closely linked in the data.
12 
  
VI.  Asymmetric Information and Fundamental Uncertainty 
The evidence suggests that the effectiveness of outside directors depends on the 
cost of acquiring information about the firm, as proxied by the accuracy, availability, and 
agreement of analyst forecasts. In this section, we attempt to understand the nature of 
these information costs, for example, whether they represent asymmetric information 
between insiders and outsiders or fundamental uncertainty that impacts both insiders and 
outsiders. The recent theoretical literature emphasizes information asymmetry (e.g., 
Raheja (2005), Harris and Raviv (forthcoming)), while the empirical literature on board 
composition has tended to focus on fundamental uncertainty, typically measured as the 
volatility of a firm’s stock price (e.g., Boone et al. (forthcoming), Coles et al. 
(forthcoming), and Linck et al. (forthcoming)).  
Our information cost index is likely to compound both information asymmetry 
and fundamental uncertainty. In an attempt to isolate the different information effects, we 
reestimated the main regressions with several additional terms that interact the change in 
board independence with alternative information variables. The first added variable is the 
volatility of stock returns, defined as the standard deviation of monthly returns in 2000, a 
commonly used measure of fundamental uncertainty (e.g., Litvak (2007), Boone et al. 
(forthcoming)). To the extent that stock return volatility captures fundamental 
                                                 
12 As a final check for the concern that our main specification may somehow be biased to produce the 
results that we document, we estimated placebo regressions (unreported) for the pre-treatment period 1996-
2000. The key coefficients were insignificant.   30
uncertainty, the coefficient on the analyst forecast-based information index will represent 
the remaining asymmetric information effect.
13 The second added variable is the market-
to-book ratio. It is often argued that the market-to-book ratio captures the presence of 
future growth opportunities relative to assets, and that future growth opportunities are 
inherently more difficult to measure than assets in place (Smith and Watts, 1992). 
Whether this is asymmetric information or fundamental uncertainty is open to debate. 
The third variable is the fraction of intangible assets, calculated as one minus the value of 
plant, property, and equipment as a fraction of assets (PPE). Intangible assets are often 
thought to give rise to asymmetric information (Harris and Raviv, 1991), although it 
seems possible they could also be a source of fundamental uncertainty if both insiders 
and outsiders find them difficult to value. All three information variables – stock return 
volatility, market-to-book, and 1–PPE – are normalized to take on values between zero 
and one, like our information cost index, so that the coefficients can be directly 
compared.
14 
Table 6 reports the regression results. As before, each column in each panel 
represents a single regression of performance on the same control variables as in Table 3, 
and to conserve space we only report the coefficients of interest. One notable finding is 
that the analyst-forecast-based information index continues to be negative and different 
from zero at high levels of statistical significance, and the coefficients are large in 
                                                 
13 Fama and Jensen (1983) and Linck et al. (forthcoming) argue that firms with significant stock price 
volatility are likely also to have greater information asymmetry. To the extent that volatility incorporates 
some information asymmetry, the information cost index will be an underestimate of the asymmetric 
information effect. 
14 The variables are defined as: market-to-book = (Data Item 6 + Data Item 25 * Data Item 199 – Data Item 
60 – Data Item 74) / Data Item 6; PP&E = Data Item 8 / Data Item 6. For each measure (including stock 
return variance) each firm’s percentile ranking was normalized to take on values between 0 and 1.   31
magnitude. The coefficient on the stock return volatility variable is positive in two 
regressions and negative in one regression but quantitatively small in all three 
regressions, statistically insignificant in the Q regression, and on the edges of significance 
in the other two regressions. The amount of fundamental uncertainty does not appear to 
have a strong influence on the effectiveness of outside directors. To the extent that stock 
return volatility is capturing fundamental uncertainty, the coefficient on the analyst-
forecast-based information index is likely to represent the effect of asymmetric 
information on outside director effectiveness. The healthy coefficients on information 
asymmetry variables lend support to recent theories of Raheja (2005), Adams and 
Ferreira (2007), and Harris and Raviv (forthcoming). 
The coefficient on the market-to-book interaction is negative and statistically 
different from zero at better than the 5 percent level for all three performance measures. 
Under the conventional interpretation that market-to-book captures growth opportunities, 
these findings suggest that one factor influencing outsider effectiveness is the cost of 
evaluating growth opportunities. When growth opportunities are few, outside directors 
can be effective, perhaps because they primarily serve a monitoring function. When 
growth opportunities are abundant, outside directors are likely to be ineffective, perhaps 
because monitoring is less important than providing advice and consultation. 
The coefficients on the intangible assets interaction are small and never close to 
statistical significance. It could be that intangibility is not an important source of 
asymmetric information, or this particular type of information asymmetry is not an 
important determinant of outside director effectiveness. 
   32
VII.   Are the Information Cost Variables Proxies for Other Factors? 
  This section considers the possibility that the estimated effect of the information 
cost variable is spurious, that is, the possibility that the information cost variable is a 
proxy for some other factor that actually drives the outside director-performance relation. 
 
A.   New Economy Firms 
  One possibility is that the information cost variable is capturing a distinction 
between “new economy” firms and old economy firms rather than a difference in the cost 
of acquiring information. New economy firms are young firms based in technology-
intensive industries. They may have few analysts following them and less accurate 
forecasts for life cycle reasons, not because it is inherently more difficult to acquire 
information about them. If so, an alternative explanation of our findings could be that an 
increase in outside directors improves the performance of new economy firms (perhaps 
because of their underdeveloped governance systems), but hurts mature, old economy 
firms (perhaps because they are near an optimal board composition to begin with).  
There are several ways to explore this possibility. The first, which we use in our 
main regressions, is to include industry fixed effects. As noted above, the main results in 
Table 3 appear with and without industry fixed effects. Second, we find that there are not 
many new economy firms in our sample. Following Murphy (2003), we define a new 
economy firm as a company with a primary SIC code of 3570, 3571, 3572, 3576, 3577, 
3661, 3674, 4812, 4813, 5045, 5961, 7370, 7371, 7372, and 7373. Based on this 
definition, we find that only 11.7 percent of sample firms are classified as new economy, 
with 13.2 percent in the compliant firm sample and 9.0 percent in the noncompliant firm   33
sample. Moreover, we find a healthy amount of variation in information cost within 
industries – the standard deviation of the information cost index is 0.33 among new 
industry firms and 0.39 among old industry firms – indicating there is not a tight 
connection between information cost and being a new industry firm. 
  Table 7 addresses more directly the possibility that the estimated information 
effect is actually a new economy effect. As before, each column in each panel reports 
estimates from a single regression. Each regression includes the same control variables as 
Table 3, including 48 industry fixed effects, but we only report the coefficients of 
primary interest (meaning we omit the coefficients on board size, leverage ratio, firm age, 
and market value of equity). In panel A, we exclude all new industry firms (following the 
definition above) and in panel B, we exclude all “young” firms, defined as companies 
with less that a 10-year history in Compustat by the year 2000. In both panels, the 
coefficient on the independence-information cost interaction term remains negative and 
different from zero at better than the 1 percent level of statistical significance. This is one 
piece of evidence that the information cost effect is not capturing a distinction between 
new economy and old economy firms.
15 
  As an alternative approach, the regressions in panel C use the full sample but 
introduce a separate interaction term between the change in independent directors and a 
dummy variable equal to one for new economy firms. If the information cost effect is 
actually a proxy for a new economy effect, then the new interaction term would be 
significant and negative, and would rob the original interaction term of significance. 
                                                 
15 We also estimated the regressions using the subsample of only new economy firms (and using the 
subsample of only young firms). The key interaction coefficients remain negative and qualitatively similar, 
but the estimates are much less precise because of the small sample size.   34
However, as can be seen, the new interaction term is quantitatively modest, significant 
only in the Q regression, and its introduction leads to only a modest change in the 
coefficient on the original interaction variable. Panel D repeats the same exercise, but 
introduces an interaction term between the change in independent directors and a dummy 
variable equal to one for young firms. Again, the new interaction coefficient is small and 
statistically insignificant, and its inclusion has no material effect on the coefficient of the 
original interaction variable. In short, none of these exercises suggests there is reason to 
worry that our information cost variable is actually a proxy for new economy versus old 
economy firms. 
 
B.   Director Expertise 
A body of empirical research argues that what matters for performance is not the 
number of outside directors, but their qualifications. For example, DeFond et al. (2005) 
argue that financial expertise is important, and Fich (2005) argues that business 
knowledge and experience are critical (see Yermack (2006) for a survey of the literature.) 
This raises the question whether the connection we find between performance and 
changes in board independence might in fact be caused by concurrent changes in the 
qualifications of directors.  To explore this possibility, we re-estimate the main equations 
and add a measure of director qualifications as an explanatory variable, as well as 
director qualifications interacted with information cost. If the effects we have been 
attributing to a change in board independence are in fact caused by a change in 
qualifications, the coefficients on the board independence variables should lose 
significance.   35
We consider three types of qualifications that have received attention in the 
literature: A director is said to have an “academic” qualification if he or she is a professor 
in a college or university, a “corporate” qualification if he or she is an executive in a 
corporation, and a “financial” qualification if he or she is employed in a financial or 
investments-related firm.
16 Between 2000 and 2005, both compliant and noncompliant 
firms added an average of 0.3 independent directors with academic expertise and one 
independent director with financial expertise, and both reduced the number of 
independent directors with corporate expertise (-1.3 directors in compliant firms and -0.8 
directors in noncompliant firms on average). Overall, the total number of independent 
directors with at least one of these qualifications was unchanged in compliant firms and 
increased by 0.5 at noncompliant firms on average. These numbers imply that roughly 
half of the independent directors added at noncompliant firms from 2000 to 2005 were 
qualified directors. 
  Table 8 reports regressions that control for director qualifications. As before, each 
column in each panel reports estimates from a single regression. The control variables are 
the same as in Table 3, but we report only the coefficients of interest, and do not report 
the first-stage regression. The panels differ by which type of qualification is controlled. 
The main message from the table is that the coefficients associated with independent 
directors do not change in an important way when the controls for director qualifications 
are included. In particular, the key interaction coefficient remains negative and 
                                                 
16 More specifically, we define independent directors as having academic qualifications if their primary job 
title in the IRRC database is “professor” or “academic.” They are classified as having corporate 
qualifications if their primary job title is “CEO,” “president,” “chairman,” “COO,” “vice president,” 
“partner,” “corporate executive” or “consultant.” They are classified as having financial qualifications if 
their primary job title is “investor,” “financial,” “economist,” or “economic.”   36
statistically significant in every regression of every panel. The director qualifications 
variables are smaller in magnitude and can never be distinguished from zero at 
conventional levels of statistical significance. In short, Table 8 gives no reason to believe 
that the observed performance changes are driven by changes in director qualifications 
rather than changes in director independence. 
 
C.   Unmeasured SOX Effects 
  Another possibility is that our information cost index is absorbing other 
unmeasured regulatory effects stemming from SOX or other concurrent regulations. For 
example, it seems possible that the various disclosure requirements of SOX might have 
had a different effect on low information cost firms than on high information cost firms. 
Because board independence tended to increase during our sample period, we might 
detect differential performance associated with increased board independences in low and 
high information cost firms simply because SOX’s disclosure requirements had a 
different performance impact on low and high information cost firms.
17 Now one 
problem with this story is that we might expect firms with high information costs to show 
the most improved performance when required to disclose more information, which 
would create a spurious effect that runs in the opposite direction of what we find (that is, 
it would result in a finding that outside directors help high information cost firms and 
hurt low information cost firms). Nevertheless, a straightforward way to control for the 
possibility that our results incorporate unmeasured SOX or other regulatory effects is to 
introduce the information cost index directly into the equation. The coefficient on the 
                                                 
17 By including market capitalization, our main specification controls for the possibility that the cost of 
internal controls mandated by SOX may depend on firm size (Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2007).   37
level of the information cost index will capture any SOX effects that are conditional on 
information costs. 
  Table 9 reports the regressions. They are the same as the central regressions from 
Table 3 except for the inclusion of the information cost index in levels. The results 
indicate that information cost levels have a negative effect on all three measures of 
performance, but distinguishable from zero only for Q. The coefficients associated with 
independent directors are robust to the inclusion of the information cost levels. In 
particular, the key interaction coefficient remains negative and statistically significant in 
every regression, and the magnitudes of the effects are still nontrivial. For example, an 
increase of 10 percent in the percentage of outside directors on the board is associated 
with 1.1 percent higher ROA in firms with an information cost in the lowest quartile 
(compared to 1.3 percent when information cost levels are not included in the regression) 
and 1.4 lower ROA for firms in the highest quartile (compared to 1.7 percent when 
information cost levels are not included in the regression). It does not seem that the 
information cost variable is capturing unmeasured effects associated with SOX or other 
concurrent regulations.
18 
 
                                                 
18 Another possibility is that the information cost variable might proxy for overly aggressive accounting 
methods. Outside directors might inhibit aggressive accounting, leading to a decline in reported ROA (as 
well as Q and stock returns if the market underestimated the extent of the accounting problems). To assess 
this possibility, we estimated but do not report regressions that included a variable that interacted the 
change in independent directors and a measure of earnings management in 2000 based on the total accrual 
measure of Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995). The coefficient on this interaction term was negative and 
significant, consistent with the aggressive accounting view, but the coefficient on the independence-
information cost interaction term remained negative and significant.   38
D.   Systematic Risk 
Another issue arises from the use of stock returns as a performance measure. Our 
estimates do not control for systematic risk, and it seems possible that the information 
cost index could be correlated with a systematic risk factor for which investors demand 
compensation. If that were the case, our results in the stock return regressions might in 
some way be driven by risk rather than information cost (this argument is more 
complicated than it seems because even if the cost index is correlated with a risk factor, it 
is not obvious why the impact of outside directors would be dependent on the risk factor.) 
On the other hand, the consistency of the results across the three different performance 
measures argues against the idea of spurious relation due to an omitted risk factor 
because the risk factor would not afflict the ROA measure. Regardless of these a priori 
arguments, it is nevertheless useful to make an empirical assessment of this issue by 
directly adjusting for systematic risk. 
Table 10 presents the results. As before, each column in each panel reports 
estimates from a single regression. We use the full set of control variables from Table 3, 
but report only the coefficients of interest, and we do not report the first-stage regression. 
The dependent variable in panel A is the average monthly stock return over the period 
indicated at the top of each column. The dependent variable in panel B is the average 
monthly return minus the contemporaneous monthly CRSP value-weighted index return. 
The dependent variable in panel C is the average monthly return minus the return on a 
matched portfolio from a 5 x 5 size and book-to-market model.  
The dependent variable in the first column is the average monthly return over the 
entire period 2001-2005. Thus, the panel A estimates are the same as those in column (7)   39
of Table 3. The dependent variable in panels B and panel C are adjusted for systematic 
risk. The estimates are not different in an important way in panels A, B, C, suggesting 
that the industry fixed effects were already capturing differences in systematic risk fairly 
well. More important, the similarity across panels indicates that controlling for systematic 
risk in the performance variable does not alter the conclusions. 
  In the remaining columns of Table 10, the dependent variable is the stock return 
for a given year, as indicated at the top of each column. The purpose of these columns is 
to check if the results are driven by one or two specific years rather than the entire period.  
  We are interested in this issue because 2000 and 2001 contained the bursting of 
the “dot-com” bubble, and could be special cases. In any event, the performance results 
do not appear to be driven by a single year. The key interaction coefficient is negative in 
all five years in every panel, and statistically different from zero at the 10 percent level in 
12 of 15 cases. The effect seems to be weakest in terms of coefficient magnitude and 
significance in the years immediately after the passage of SOX, 2003 and 2004, 
consistent with the idea that stock returns are forward-looking and incorporated the effect 
of SOX relatively quickly. 
 
VIII.  Information Costs and the Determinants of Board Composition 
  Given our finding that the effectiveness of outside directors depends on the cost 
of acquiring information about the firm, it is natural to ask whether firms take 
information cost considerations into account when composing their boards. To the extent 
that board composition is related to information costs, it lends support to recent   40
information-based theories. It also provides another reason to believe that our information 
cost variables are in fact capturing information costs and not something else. 
  Table 11 addresses this issue by reporting regressions of board composition on 
information cost using the full panel of board composition data from IRRC (1996-2005). 
Information cost is indicated with our information cost index, normalized to take on 
values between zero and one. As before, each column is a regression, and all the 
regressions include our standard set of controls (board size, leverage ratio, firm age, and 
firm size). In the first three columns, the dependent variable is the percentage of outsiders 
on the board. In the last three columns, the dependent variable is the likelihood of a board 
with a majority of independent directors. Columns (1) and (4) report baseline regressions. 
Columns (2) and (5) report regressions with year fixed effects to take into account the 
upward trend in outsider representation over time. Columns (3) and (6) include both year 
and industry fixed effect, for robustness. All regressions report standard errors that are 
clustered by firm because we have repeated firm observations in the panel. 
  The main result from Table 11 is that the coefficient on the information cost index 
is negative and significantly different from zero in all six regressions. Firms with a high 
information cost use fewer independent directors than firms with a low information cost, 
consistent with the idea that firms take information cost into account when constituting 
their boards. The magnitude of the differences is modest. For example, based on the 
results in column (3), the percentage of independent directors in firms with an 
information cost in the highest quartile is roughly 2.8 percent lower than the percentage 
in firms with an information cost in the lowest quartile. Two forces are likely to bias the 
estimates against finding an information effect: recent regulations may have constrained   41
firms to choose board structures that are suboptimal and not fully responsive to 
information cost conditions, and some managers might ignore information costs because 
they want to construct their boards to stifle dissent rather than to maximize value.  
 
IX. Discussion 
  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and new exchange regulations require firms to increase 
the representation of outside directors on their boards. This paper takes advantage of the 
more-or-less exogenous changes in outside directors brought about by the new 
regulations to identify the effect of board independence on firm performance. By using 
exogenous changes in board composition, we are able to mitigate the endogeneity 
problem that has hampered previous attempts to estimate the effect of board 
independence. One of our findings is that the effect of outside directors on performance is 
rather small on average. This suggests that the modest effect of board independence 
found in previous studies is not due primarily to a failure to control for endogeneity of 
board composition. 
  Perhaps our main finding, however, is identification of conditions under which 
outside directors can have a material effect on performance. Consistent with recent 
theoretical research, we find that outside directors are associated with significantly better 
performance when their cost of acquiring information is low, and are associated with 
significantly worse performance when their cost of acquiring information is high. These 
findings suggests that the failure of previous studies to find an effect of outside directors 
on performance may have been because they failed to distinguish low and high   42
information cost environments. That is, it is important to ask not whether but when are 
outside directors effective? 
  The results point to several conclusions. The finding that exogenous changes in 
outsiders hurt some firms suggest that some firms keep the number of outside directors 
low for optimal reasons, and the one-size-fits-all approach of the new regulations may not 
be ideal. The finding that some firms perform better when they are forced to take on more 
outside directors suggests that some firms are not composing their boards in order to 
maximize value, but rather may be trying to insulate management from oversight. This 
suggests that market forces alone may not be enough to bring about value maximization 
in some cases, and the new regulations may be beneficial for shareholders of some firms. 
Along the same lines, our evidence suggests that regulations requiring independent 
boards are more than window dressing, and that the distinction between inside and 
independent directors adopted by the new regulations may have teeth. 
  Our findings suggest that outside directors can have a material effect on firm 
performance, for better or worse, but we do not identify the mechanism through which 
those performance changes occur. Among the more important responsibilities of the 
board are hiring and if necessary firing the CEO, and approving acquisitions of other 
firms. There is some existing evidence showing that outsider-dominated boards act 
differently on these issues than insider-dominated boards. For example, Weisbach (1988) 
finds that outsider-dominated boards are more likely to replace the CEO after poor 
performance than insider-dominated boards. As for acquisition policy, several studies 
find a positive relation between announcement returns and board independence (Byrd and 
Hickman, 1992; Matsusaka, 1993; Cotter et al., 1997). Our findings suggest that the   43
actions taken by the board and the value consequences of those actions are likely to 
depend on the information environment, which would seem to be a natural direction for 
future research.  
  We conclude by noting some caveats or limitations to our analysis. First, our 
empirical strategy delivers estimates of the effectiveness of new outside directors that are 
added in response to noncompliance with the new regulations. Independent directors 
added to the board for other reasons may be different than those added for compliance 
reasons. Formally, this boils down to a concern about an omitted variable associated with 
outsiders added for compliance. Our Table 8 regressions partly allay this concern by 
controlling for director qualifications, but we cannot rule out the possibility of an 
unobserved variable that makes outsiders added for compliance reasons different from 
other outsiders. In a related vein, our results do not imply that low information cost firms 
can continue to improve value indefinitely by adding outside directors, although the ideas 
in this paper could conceivably be extended to generate estimates of optimal board 
composition and provide firms with prescriptive advice on improving performance. As 
for high information cost firms, our evidence suggests that they need to be particularly 
careful in selecting outside directors because the high cost of information is a significant 
challenge to their effectiveness. 
  A second caveat is that our estimates might overstate the effect of board 
independence because our instrumental variable, compliance with SOX in 2000, may be 
driving a variety of other unobservable changes in noncompliant firms.
19 That is, the 
effect we are attributing to changes in independent directors could also include effects 
                                                 
19 Black et al. (2006) describe a similar problem in their study of a policy experiment in Korea.   44
from other SOX-related changes. It is less obvious why other SOX-related changes 
would have differential effects depending on the cost of information. For example, Litvak 
(2007) argues that SOX had an adverse impact on risky firms because SOX discouraged 
risk-taking, forcing risky firms to take on a suboptimal amount of risk. Following this 
argument, if our information cost variable represented risk, then we might expect a 
differential compliance effect conditional on information cost. The evidence we report in 
Table 9 suggests that our information cost variables are not simply proxies for risk, so 
this particular explanation for our findings is unlikely, but the possibility remains that 
there is some other SOX effect at work that we have not taken into account.   45
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New Regulations Concerning Independent Directors 
 
      Minimum Number of Independent Directors 
Regulation Adopted  Definition  of  Independence 
Board of 
Directors 
Audit 
Committee 
Compensation 
Committee 
Nominating 
Committee 
            
Sarbanes-Oxley  2002  Person who does not accept any fee 
from issuer (other than as director) and 
is not an “affiliated person of the issuer 
or any subsidiary.” 
… 100%  …  … 
NYSE  2003  Person who has “no material 
relationship” with company. 
Majority 100% 100%  100% 
Nasdaq  2003  Person who does not have a relationship 
with company that would interfere with 
“independent judgment.” 
Majority 100%  Majority  Majority 
            
 
Note. Foreign private issuers and controlled companies are exempted from listing standards not required by SOX. Also exempt are limited partnerships, 
companies in bankruptcy, closed-end and open-end funds.  
Table 2 
Summary Statistics 
Panel A reports summary statistics for all firm-years, 1996-2005. Panel B compares firms that were and 
were not in compliance with SOX in 2000, using data from 2000. A firm was compliant if its audit 
committee consisted entirely of independent directors. Dispersion of analyst forecasts is the standard 
deviation of quarterly EPS forecasts prior to announcement normalized by assets per share. Analyst 
forecast error is the absolute difference between the consensus forecast prior to announcement and the 
actual quarterly EPS normalized by assets per share.  
 
Panel A: All Firm-Years, 1996-2005 
 Mean  S.D.  N 
      
Percentage of independent directors  60.36  18.4  15,820 
Number of board members  9.55  3.00  15,820 
      
Return on assets (%)  12.56  9.59  15,135 
Tobin’s Q  1.93  1.78  15,276 
Annual stock return (%)  14.52  47.97  12,674 
      
Number of analysts    15.16  10.85  13,786 
Dispersion of analyst forecasts 0.099 0.136 12,713 
Analyst forecast error  0.214  0.377  13,346 
      
Market capitalization ($ millions)  7,000  23,072  15,279 
Assets ($ millions)  11,923  56,860  15,368 
Book  leverage  ratio  0.391 2.17 15,322 
Firm age  25.54  15.79  15,368 
 
Panel B: Comparison of Compliant and Noncompliant Firms in 2000 
  Compliant Firms    Noncompliant Firms   
  Mean   S.D.   Mean   S.D. 
t-statistic for 
difference 
             
Percentage of independent directors  69.7    15.2    52.7    17.3  15.79 
Number of board members  9.63    2.90    9.91    3.05  1.42 
             
Return on assets (%)  14.86    9.30    15.35    8.76  0.83 
Tobin’s  Q  2.16   2.00   2.39  2.63  1.46 
Annual  stock  return  (%)  15.97   40.58   14.70  38.17  0.49 
             
Number of analysts    16.06    11.34    16.64    11.12  0.77 
Analyst  forecast  dispersion  0.085   0.115   0.069  0.092  2.45 
Analyst  forecast  error  0.167   0.220   0.155  0.285  0.48 
             
Market capitalization ($ millions)  8,372    26,347    13,358    47,271  1.86 
Assets  ($  millions)  12,012   48,737   15,714  67,340  0.93 
Book  leverage  ratio  0.414   0.710   0.322  1.183  1.36 
Firm  age  26.84   16.38   26.03  15.41  0.78 
 Table 3 
Regressions of Performance on Independent Directors and Information Cost 
This table presents estimates from regressing firm performance during 2000-2005 on the change in the percentage of independent directors. Each column reports 
estimates from a single regression, with standard errors (robust and clustered by industry) in parentheses. The first stage (column (1)) regresses changes in the 
percentage of independent directors on a dummy variable equal to one if the firm did not comply with the SOX requirement of a fully independent audit committee 
in 2000, and other variables. The second stage uses the fitted changes in the percentage of independent directors from the first stage as an explanatory variable. The 
information cost variable is an index that represents how costly it is for outsiders to acquire information about the firm. All regressions include industry fixed effects 
for the 48 Fama-French industries. Standard errors are robust and clustered by industry. Significance levels are indicated: * = 10%’ ** = 5%, *** = 1%. 
    
Dependent Variable 
 First  stage  ΔROA  Δlog(Q)  Stock return   ΔROA  Δlog(Q) Stock  return 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) 
              
Dummy = 1 if firm did not 
comply with SOX in 2000 
11.383
*** 
(1.021) 
 
…  … … … …  … 
ΔIndependent directors  … 0.001 
(0.029) 
-0.252 
(0.223) 
0.005 
(0.005) 
0.269
*** 
(0.099) 
1.918
*** 
(0.330) 
0.056
*** 
(0.009) 
ΔIndependent directors × 
Information cost 
…       -0.587
*** 
(0.189) 
-4.714
*** 
(0.597) 
-0.103
*** 
(0.021) 
Board size  -0.098 
(0.189) 
-0.021 
(0.128) 
1.415
* 
(0.751) 
0.002 
(0.020) 
0.001 
(0.140) 
1.307
* 
(0.715) 
-0.003 
(0.020) 
Leverage ratio  0.237 
(0.478) 
0.967
** 
(0.388) 
5.113
*** 
(1.140) 
0.045 
(0.059) 
1.001
*** 
(0.342) 
5.167
*** 
(0.632) 
0.045 
(0.068) 
Firm age  -0.071
** 
(0.033) 
0.010 
(0.019) 
0.495
*** 
(0.131) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
0.011 
(0.022) 
0.562
*** 
(0.144) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
Market value of equity, logarithm  0.022 
(0.244) 
-0.365
** 
(0.141) 
-13.936
*** 
(1.992) 
-0.361
*** 
(0.049) 
-0.442
*** 
(0.150) 
-14.985
*** 
(2.194) 
-0.384
*** 
(0.052) 
R
2 0.183  0.111  0.369  0.332  0.141  0.413  0.363 
Observations  1,054  983  990 880 897 905  805 
 Table 4 
Regressions of Performance on Independent Directors without Instrumental Variables 
This table presents estimates from regressing firm performance during 2000-2005 on the change in the percentage of independent directors. Each column reports 
estimates from a single regression, with standard errors (robust and clustered by industry) in parentheses. The information cost variable is an index that represents 
how costly it is for outsiders to acquire information about the firm. All regressions include industry fixed effects for the 48 Fama-French industries. Significance 
levels are indicated: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%. 
   
Dependent Variable 
  ΔROA  Δlog(Q) Stock  return  ΔROA  Δlog(Q) Stock  return 
  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
         
ΔIndependent directors  0.009 
(0.012) 
0.008 
(0.057) 
0.003
* 
(0.002) 
0.069
* 
(0.040) 
0.575
*** 
(0.192) 
0.010 
(0.006) 
ΔIndependent directors × Information cost  … …  …  -0.135 
(0.093) 
-1.204
*** 
(0.420) 
-0.013 
(0.014) 
Board size  -0.020 
(0.131) 
1.420
* 
(0.747) 
0.002 
(0.020) 
-0.014 
(0.141) 
1.215 
(0.744) 
-0.003 
(0.022) 
Leverage ratio  0.968
** 
(0.394) 
5.117
*** 
(1.138) 
0.045 
(0.060) 
0.984
** 
(0.392) 
5.060
*** 
(1.048) 
0.043 
(0.062) 
Firm age  0.011 
(0.019) 
0.514
*** 
(0.132) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.012 
(0.021) 
0.590
*** 
(0.137) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
Market value of equity, logarithm  -0.369
** 
(0.146) 
-13.981
*** 
(2.008) 
-0.361
*** 
(0.049) 
-0.381
** 
(0.152) 
-14.561
*** 
(2.059) 
-0.371
*** 
(0.051) 
2 R   0.112  0.368 0.332 0.123 0.380 0.338 
Observations  983  990 880 897 905 805 
 Table 5 
Alternative Regressions of Firm Performance on Board Independence 
Each column reports coefficient estimates from a single regression, with standard errors (robust and 
clustered by industry) in parentheses. The dependent variable is a measure of performance from 2000 to 
2005, as indicated at the top of each column. The control variables are the same as those in columns (5)-(7) 
of Table 3. We do not report the coefficients on industry fixed effects, board size, leverage ratio, firm age, 
and market value of equity. In panels A-C, the changes in independent directors are fitted values from a 
first-stage regression of the change in the percentage of independent directors on a dummy for 
noncompliance with the SOX requirement of a fully independent audit committee in 2000. In panel D, the 
first-stage regression uses noncompliance with the exchange listing requirement to have a majority of 
outside directors on the board instead of noncompliance with SOX. In panel E, the change in board control 
is +100 if it shifted from an insider to an outsider majority, -100 if it shifted from an outsider to an insider 
majority, and zero otherwise. Significance levels are indicated: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%. 
 
  ΔROA  Δlog(Q)  Stock return 
Panel A: Information Cost Measured by Number of Analysts 
ΔIndependent directors  0.123
** 
(0.059) 
0.609
* 
(0.303) 
0.036
*** 
(0.009) 
ΔIndependent directors × 
Information cost 
-0.222
*** 
(0.082) 
-1.617
*** 
(0.282) 
-0.053
*** 
(0.012) 
Panel B: Information Cost Measured by Dispersion of Analyst Forecasts 
ΔIndependent directors  0.167
** 
(0.072) 
1.023
*** 
(0.287) 
0.032
*** 
(0.006) 
ΔIndependent directors × 
Information cost 
-0.392
*** 
(0.136) 
-3.007
*** 
(0.449) 
-0.054
*** 
(0.014) 
Panel C. Information Cost Measured by Analyst Forecast Error 
ΔIndependent directors  0.159
** 
(0.075) 
1.114
*** 
(0.264) 
0.032
*** 
(0.007) 
ΔIndependent directors × 
Information cost 
-0.393
*** 
(0.142) 
-3.170
*** 
(0.490) 
-0.054
*** 
(0.018) 
Panel D. Compliance Measured by Majority of Outsiders on Board 
ΔIndependent directors  0.170
** 
(0.080) 
1.530
*** 
(0.292) 
0.032
*** 
(0.009) 
ΔIndependent directors × 
Information cost index 
-0.280
* 
(0.145) 
-3.069
*** 
(0.414) 
-0.057
*** 
(0.017) 
Panel E. ΔBoard Control Measured by Shift from Majority Insiders to Majority Outsiders 
ΔBoard control  0.089
** 
(0.043) 
0.725
*** 
(0.161) 
0.024
*** 
(0.004) 
ΔBoard control ×  
Information cost index 
-0.196
** 
(0.085) 
-1.863
*** 
(0.325) 
-0.044
*** 
(0.008) 
  Table 6 
Uncertainty and Information Asymmetry in Regressions of Performance on Board 
Independence 
Each column reports coefficient estimates from a single regression, with standard errors (robust and clustered 
by industry) in parentheses. The dependent variable is a measure of performance from 2000 to 2005, as 
indicated at the top of each column. The control variables are the same as those in columns (5)-(7) of Table 3. 
We do not report the coefficients on industry fixed effects, board size, leverage ratio, firm age, and market 
value of equity. The changes in independent directors are fitted values from a first-stage regression of the 
change in the percentage of independent directors on a dummy for noncompliance with the SOX requirement 
of a fully independent audit committee in 2000. Stock return volatility is measured as the standard deviation of 
monthly returns in 2000. Intangibility is measured as one minus the value of plant, property, and equipment as 
a fraction of assets. All measures are based on percentile rankings and take on values between zero and one. 
Significance levels are indicated: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%. 
 
  ΔROA  Δlog(Q)  Stock return 
      
ΔIndependent directors  0.397
** 
(0.156) 
4.672
*** 
(0.560) 
0.093
*** 
(0.015) 
ΔIndependent directors × 
Information cost 
-0.564
*** 
(0.197) 
-4.429
*** 
(0.586) 
-0.104
*** 
(0.020) 
ΔIndependent directors × 
Stock return volatility 
0.170
* 
(0.100) 
-0.012 
(0.527) 
0.032
* 
(0.016) 
ΔIndependent directors × 
Market-to-Book 
-0.358
** 
(0.160) 
-4.678
*** 
(0.738) 
-0.077
*** 
(0.021) 
ΔIndependent directors × 
Intangibility 
0.002 
(0.114) 
-0.334 
(0.381) 
-0.009 
(0.013) 
2 R   0.157 0.488 0.388 
Observations  881 883 795 
 Table 7 
New Economy Firms and Regressions of Performance on Board Independence 
Each column of each panel reports coefficient estimates from a single regression, with standard errors 
(robust and clustered by industry) in parentheses. The dependent variable is a measure of performance from 
2000 to 2005, as indicated at the top of each column. The control variables are the same as those in 
columns (5)-(7) of Table 3. We do not report the coefficients on industry fixed effects, board size, leverage 
ratio, firm age, and market value of equity. The changes in independent directors are fitted values from a 
first-stage regression of the change in the percentage of independent directors on a dummy for 
noncompliance with the SOX requirement of a fully independent audit committee in 2000 (not reported). 
Panel A excludes new economy firms (as defined in the text), panel B excludes firms with less than 10 
years of Compustat data, and panels C and D use the full sample but include another interaction term. 
Significance levels are indicated: * = 10%; ** = 5%; *** = 1%. 
 
  ΔROA  Δlog(Q)  Stock return 
Panel A: New Economy Firms Excluded from Sample 
ΔIndependent directors  0.303
*** 
(0.089) 
1.890
*** 
(0.370) 
0.059
*** 
(0.009) 
ΔIndependent directors × 
Information cost 
-0.588
*** 
(0.165) 
-4.313
*** 
(0.714) 
-0.096
*** 
(0.023) 
Panel B: Young Firms Excluded from Sample 
ΔIndependent directors  0.225
*** 
(0.078) 
1.595
*** 
(0.353) 
0.057
*** 
(0.011) 
ΔIndependent directors × 
Information cost 
-0.446
*** 
(0.149) 
-4.133
*** 
(0.717) 
-0.103
*** 
(0.022) 
Panel C. Interaction with New Economy Dummy Included 
ΔIndependent directors  0.265
** 
(0.100) 
1.965
*** 
(0.339) 
0.056
*** 
(0.009) 
ΔIndependent directors × 
Information cost 
-0.589
*** 
(0.187) 
-4.686
*** 
(0.606) 
-0.104
*** 
(0.020) 
ΔIndependent directors × 
New economy dummy 
0.061 
(0.066) 
-0.852
*** 
(0.305) 
0.005 
(0.012) 
Panel D. Interaction with Young Firm Dummy Included 
ΔIndependent directors  0.269
** 
(0.102) 
2.053
*** 
(0.350) 
0.056
*** 
(0.010) 
ΔIndependent directors × 
Information cost index 
-0.587
*** 
(0.191) 
-4.831
*** 
(0.620) 
-0.103
*** 
(0.021) 
ΔIndependent directors × 
Young firm dummy 
-0.001 
(0.082) 
-0.559
* 
(0.293) 
-0.001 
(0.010) 
 Table 8 
Regressions of Performance on Board Independence and Director Qualifications 
Each column of each panel reports coefficient estimates from a single regression, with standard errors (robust and 
clustered by industry) in parentheses. The dependent variable is a measure of performance from 2000 to 2005, as 
indicated at the top of each column. The control variables are the same as those in columns (5)-(7) of Table 3. We do 
not report the coefficients on industry fixed effects, board size, leverage ratio, firm age, and market value of equity. The 
changes in independent directors are fitted values from a first-stage regression of the change in the percentage of 
independent directors on a dummy for noncompliance with the SOX requirement of a fully independent audit 
committee in 2000 (not reported). The panels differ in how the percentage of qualified directors is counted. 
Significance levels are indicated: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%. 
 
  ΔROA  Δlog(Q)  Stock return 
Panel A: Academic Qualification 
ΔIndependent directors  0.279
*** 
(0.102) 
1.929
*** 
(0.370) 
0.059
*** 
(0.010) 
ΔIndependent directors × 
Information cost 
-0.602
*** 
(0.197) 
-4.709
*** 
(0.688) 
-0.110
*** 
(0.022) 
ΔQualified directors  0.021 
(0.060) 
0.046 
(0.356) 
-0.002 
(0.008) 
ΔQualified directors × 
Information cost 
-0.048 
(0.126) 
0.107 
(0.696) 
0.007 
(0.015) 
Panel B: Corporate Qualification 
ΔIndependent directors  0.261
** 
(0.100) 
1.722
*** 
(0.353) 
0.055
*** 
(0.010) 
ΔIndependent directors × 
Information cost 
-0.565
*** 
(0.199) 
-4.286
*** 
(0.674) 
-0.103
*** 
(0.021) 
ΔQualified directors  -0.015 
(0.023) 
-0.145 
(0.114) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
ΔQualified directors × 
Information cost 
0.030 
(0.054) 
0.311 
(0.234) 
0.004 
(0.006) 
Panel C. Financial Qualification 
ΔIndependent directors  0.325
*** 
(0.104) 
1.888
*** 
(0.434) 
0.055
*** 
(0.011) 
ΔIndependent directors × 
Information cost 
-0.696
*** 
(0.200) 
-4.641
*** 
(0.854) 
-0.102
*** 
(0.023) 
ΔQualified directors  -0.028 
(0.030) 
-0.108 
(0.203) 
0.006 
(0.006) 
ΔQualified directors × 
Information cost 
0.066 
(0.059) 
-0.021 
(0.360) 
-0.006 
(0.011) 
Panel D. Academic, Corporate, or Financial Qualification 
ΔIndependent directors  0.284
*** 
(0.102) 
1.936
*** 
(0.358) 
0.058
*** 
(0.010) 
ΔIndependent directors × 
Information cost index 
-0.613
*** 
(0.196) 
-4.719
*** 
(0.633) 
-0.109
*** 
(0.021) 
ΔQualified directors  -0.027 
(0.026) 
-0.158 
(0.126) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
ΔQualified directors × 
Information cost 
0.060 
(0.060) 
0.276 
(0.231) 
0.003 
(0.006) 
 Table 9 
Regressions of Performance on Independent Directors and Information Cost 
Each column reports coefficient estimates from a single regression, with standard errors (robust and clustered 
by industry) in parentheses. The dependent variable is a measure of performance from 2000 to 2005, as 
indicated at the top of each column. The changes in independent directors are fitted values from a first-stage 
regression of the change in the percentage of independent directors on a dummy for noncompliance with the 
SOX requirement of a fully independent audit committee in 2000 (not reported). All regressions include 
industry fixed effects for the 48 Fama-French industries. Significance levels are indicated: * = 10%’ ** = 5%, 
*** = 1%. 
 
  ΔROA  Δlog(Q)  Stock return 
      
ΔIndependent directors  0.225
** 
(0.105) 
0.885
** 
(0.400) 
0.039
*** 
(0.013) 
Information cost  -1.335 
(2.390) 
-31.970
*** 
(9.895) 
-0.460 
(0.379) 
ΔIndependent directors × 
Information cost 
-0.497
** 
(0.213) 
-2.501
*** 
(0.765) 
-0.068
** 
(0.029) 
Board size  -0.003 
(0.140) 
1.253
* 
(0.734) 
-0.004 
(0.020) 
Leverage ratio  0.998
*** 
(0.341) 
5.158
*** 
(0.592) 
0.045 
(0.068) 
Firm age  0.011 
(0.022) 
0.562
*** 
(0.143) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
Market value of equity, log   -0.444
*** 
(0.147) 
-15.207
*** 
(2.265) 
-0.387
*** 
(0.050) 
2 R   0.141 0.415 0.363 
Observations 897  905  805 
 Table 10 
Risk-Adjusted Stock Returns 
Each column of each panel reports coefficient estimates from a single regression, with standard errors (robust and clustered by industry) in parentheses. The 
dependent variable is the average monthly return computed over fiscal year(s), as indicated at the top of each column. The control variables are the same as those 
in columns (5)-(7) of Table 3. We do not report the coefficients on industry fixed effects, board size, leverage ratio, firm age, and market value of equity. The 
changes in independent directors are fitted values from a first-stage regression of the change in the percentage of independent directors on a dummy for 
noncompliance with the SOX requirement of a fully independent audit committee in 2000 (not reported). The panels differ in how systematic risk is controlled. 
Significance levels are indicated: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%. 
 
  FY 2001-2005  FY 2001  FY 2002  FY 2003  FY 2004  FY 2005 
Panel A: Average Raw Monthly Return 
        
ΔIndependent directors 
 
0.056
*** 
(0.009) 
0.091
*** 
(0.024) 
0.100
*** 
(0.020) 
0.003 
(0.021) 
0.014 
(0.022) 
0.070
*** 
(0.018) 
ΔIndependent directors × 
Information cost 
-0.103
*** 
(0.021) 
-0.176
*** 
(0.037) 
-0.173
*** 
(0.035) 
-0.011 
(0.037) 
-0.065
* 
(0.037) 
-0.114
*** 
(0.036) 
Panel B: Average Abnormal Monthly Return Relative to CRSP Value-Weighted Index 
        
ΔIndependent directors 
 
0.058
*** 
(0.009) 
0.096
*** 
(0.022) 
0.099
*** 
(0.019) 
0.006 
(0.020) 
0.013 
(0.022) 
0.068
*** 
(0.017) 
ΔIndependent directors × 
Information cost 
-0.106
*** 
(0.020) 
-0.182
*** 
(0.035) 
-0.172
*** 
(0.034) 
-0.023 
(0.037) 
-0.059
* 
(0.035) 
-0.111
*** 
(0.036) 
Panel C: Average Abnormal Monthly Return Relative to Size and Book-to-Market 5x5 Portfolio 
        
ΔIndependent directors 
 
0.055
*** 
(0.009) 
0.080
*** 
(0.021) 
0.096
*** 
(0.020) 
0.029 
(0.020) 
0.017 
(0.020) 
0.062
*** 
(0.019) 
ΔIndependent directors × 
Information cost 
-0.102
*** 
(0.020) 
-0.157
*** 
(0.041) 
-0.152
*** 
(0.032) 
-0.060 
(0.038) 
-0.060
* 
(0.032) 
-0.108
*** 
(0.039) 
 Table 11 
Regressions of Board Composition on Information Cost 
This table reports estimates from regressions of board composition on information cost during 1996-2005. In the first three columns, the dependent variable is the 
percentage of independent directors. In the last three columns, the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if a majority of directors are independent, and the 
regression is a logit. All regressions report robust standard errors that are clustered by firm. Significance levels are indicated: * = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%. 
   
Dependent Variable 
  Percentage of independent directors  Majority of independent directors 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
         
Information index  -5.623
*** 
(1.465) 
-5.685
*** 
(1.418) 
-5.216
*** 
(1.442) 
-0.661
*** 
(0.176) 
-0.694
*** 
(0.179) 
-0.594
*** 
(0.191) 
Board size  -0.204
* 
(0.121) 
0.032 
(0.120) 
0.007 
(0.126) 
0.008 
(0.015) 
0.031
** 
(0.016) 
0.002 
(0.018) 
Leverage ratio  0.089 
(0.164) 
0.222 
(0.229) 
0.276 
(0.246) 
-0.005 
(0.018) 
0.009 
(0.025) 
0.000 
(0.017) 
Firm age  0.300
*** 
(0.022) 
0.287
*** 
(0.022) 
0.225
*** 
(0.025) 
0.030
*** 
(0.003) 
0.030
*** 
(0.003) 
0.026
*** 
(0.003) 
Market value of equity, logarithm  0.597
*** 
(0.227) 
0.098 
(0.228) 
0.464
** 
(0.222) 
0.070
** 
(0.028) 
0.015 
(0.028) 
0.111
*** 
(0.029) 
R
2  0.076  0.130  0.201  … … … 
Observations 13,467  13,467  13,401 13,467 13,467 13,401 
Year fixed effects?  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
Industry  fixed  effects?  No  No Yes No No Yes 
 Figure 1 
Mean Board and Committee Independence Percentage: 1996-2005 
This figure presents the percentage of firms with independent boards and the mean percentage of 
independent directors on corporate boards and key committees. 
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Performance of Noncompliant and Compliant Firms: 1996-2005 
This figure presents the industry and year adjusted return on assets of noncompliant and compliant firms 
relative to 1996. Noncompliant firms are classified according to information cost – low (bottom quartile), 
medium (second and third quartiles) or high (top quartile). 
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